

LEADERSHIP AS AN “ENTRY POINT” FOR COMBATING CORRUPTION AND SHAPE ON ANTI FRAUD CULTURAL SYSTEMS (Case study in Singapore)

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ABSTRACT

Singapore is a country with the lowest corruption rate in Asia. In the last two decades, the amount of data and facts released by international agencies such as Transparency International and The Political and Economic Risk Consultancy show this its entirety. This paper tries to describe the determinant aspect in eradicating corruption; how the strategy of eradicating corruption; and also recognizes the steps and strategies of corruption eradication experience in Singapore that can be “lesson-learned” by other countries especially Indonesia. Based on existing precedents and postulates, it can be concluded that an entry point for eradicating corruption in Singapore stems from strong political support (strong leadership) of party elites, government and society, as well as increased official incentives and public institutional reconstruction efforts.

I. Introduction

Corruption is a crucial issue that impedes economic development, infrastructure, and even social welfare in the Asian regional scope (Quah, 2001: 29). This hypothesis is emphasized by Mauro in his research which shows some implications of corruption. First, corruption weakens investments that have an impact through economic growth. Second, nepotism is the antithesis of the merit system which leads to “talent miss allocated” or in its simplest form is the placement of apparatus who doesn’t based on performance and capabilities. Third, state funding allocations does not work properly if there is corrupt behavior. Finally, tax evasion often found in typologies of corruption that has implications for the significance of the quantity and quality of the provision of public goods and services (Mauro, 1997: 12-17).

This trend can be measured from research data reported by international institutions that have a main office in Berlin. Transparency International (TI), in the Corruption Perception Index from 1996 to 1999 showed that of the 16 countries in Asia that were survey samples, only 5 countries included Singapore, Hong

Kong, Japan, Taiwan and Malaysia that were able to eradicate and reduce corruption in their countries each. In addition, the consistency of ranking as the “cleanest” country that Singapore obtained in the past five years. This can be measured through the findings and publications released by international institutions below.

Table 1. Country Rating with the Corruption Perception Index, from the Cleanest to the Most Corrupt in Asia. (With 12 Countries Becoming Samples)

Countries	Ranking
Singapura	1
Hongkong	2
Jepang	3
Malaysia	4
Taiwan	5
Korea Selatan	6
Filiphina	7
Thailand	8
China	9
India	10
Indonesia	11
Pakistan	12

Source: Quah, 2001: by quoting various reports from Transparency International

Table 2. Singapore Corruption Rank Based on the Last Five Years Survey

Last Five Year of Corruption Perception Index			
Year	Singapore World Rank	Score	Asian Country (Indonesia)
2012	5	87	Rank 118, Score 32
2013	5	86	Rank 114, Score 32
2014	7	84	Rank 107, Score 34
2015	7	85	Rank 88, Score 36
2016	7	84	Rank 90, Score 37

Source : Transparency International

Based on the table above, it can be concluded that Singapore’s consistency as the country with the lowest level of corruption in the Asian region over the past 5 years even during the past decade since 1996 until now, can be maintained by corruption eradication

institutions in Singapore (Quah, 2001: 29-30). This is the main reason the author takes the theme of eradicating corruption in Singapore. In addition, the study of eradicating corruption in Singapore is being interesting, because the Singapore government’s leadership capability

in reconstructing its community paradigm towards corrupt culture and behavior. In the colonial periodization, the paradigm of corruption as a “way of life” in carrying out daily life was successfully shifted into a “fact of life” that must be solved and eradicated in all sectors (Caiden 1981: 58-63). Both in the public and private sectors. Finally, consciously, the Singaporean community considers that the implications of corruption are very broad impacting on the deterioration of economic, political, infrastructure, and community welfare development (Liom Siong Guan, 2014: 133-134).

The design of this study is a descriptive analysis method that describes how leadership aspects as entry points in eradicating corruption and the development of a culture of anti-fraud systems in Singapore. The data sources based from a literature review of the research and ideas of Jon S. Quah about eradicating corruption in Singapore. Data collection techniques take from a literature review and draft in the form of journals, scientific works, and research produced by Jon S. Quah.

A. Determinan Factors for Corruption of Colonial Period Corruption

Like several countries in Asia, Singapore also has a historical record as a colony in the past, where Japan and the United Kingdom once planted their influence there. By him, understanding the determinants of corruption in Singapore, this paper will refer to various data, manuscripts, and monographs written by Jon S. Q Quah. There are two main factors behind the corruption in Singapore during the colonial era, namely the lack of political commitment from the government and the inefficiency of the strategy to eradicate corruption reflected in the process of investigation and evidence that is not optimal as well as mild legal sanctions by perpetrators and task forces. formed a colonial government (Quah, 2001 29-30).

During the colonial administration, corruption in Singapore massively occurred in the police agency. This was evident in 1879 when the government established a commission and task force aimed at investigating reports of corrupt actions and institutional inefficiencies under the Singapore Police Force (SPF) (Strait Times, from 1985-1921). The results of the investigation indicate the existence of corrupt practices involving senior and junior officials at the SPF institution. Furthermore, in 1886 similar commissions and task forces were formed to cope with corrupt actions in the same agency. From witness testimony and data found it proved the involvement of the SPF in accommodating illegal gambling that occurred in the Straits Settlement. In fact, these corrupt actions are arranged systematically and holistically by SPF officials (Quah, 1979: 24-25).

Although the colonial government had designed the formation of several commissions and task forces in 1879 and 1886, it did not simultaneously reduce corruption in Singapore (Krishna, 1939: 307-309). This trend is only permissive and far from preventive action based on the findings of previous corruption cases. Departing from this, Quah emphasized that the political commitment of the British colonial government was very low in relation to the prevention and eradication of corruption. Also, the form of omission was transformed during the postponement of the anti-corruption Act of the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (POCO) in 1937. Furthermore, the purpose of establishing the commission and task force was only political by the British colonial government (Quah, 2015: 141 -142). In fact, Quah identified three attentions underlying the formation. First, this commission aims to shape the image of colonial government elites in the eyes of the United Kingdom. Secondly, this commission was used as a tool to attack and discredit the opposition. Third, this commission also works

to accommodate government interests in cases handled (Quah, 2015: 142).

The lack of political commitment from the colonial government to eradicate corruption and the permissive attitude of the government affected the effectiveness of commissions and task forces formed and endorsed by the Singapore constitution. This can be observed based on work mechanisms and systems as outlined in several regulations and articles contained in POCO. There are two issues that make inefficiencies in eradicating corruption in the SPF body.

First, the issue of evidence of violations of criminal acts of corruption that cannot be confiscated by the commission or task force given authority. Also, the authority in the form of investigation, interception, investigation, and arrest is very limited so that it does not provide flexibility in the process of investigating corruption cases whose content and context are very serious and massive. Second, from the aspect of legal sanctions which tend to be mild and do not cause a deterrent effect for corruptors. The duration of legal sanctions imposed on perpetrators is only valid for two years and the amount of the fine is only around \$ 10,000 (Quah, 2015: 141-142).

In addition, inefficiencies also occur in the institutional structure of the Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB), which is the spearhead of eradicating corruption in this era. It is noted, there are three aspects in which strategies and steps to eradicate corruption that cause inefficiency and are slow. First, the limited number of ACB human resources is only 17. In terms of quantity, this will certainly burden the tasks and strategies in combating and cracking down on widespread and rampant

corruption in SCS and SCF agencies. Second, the institutional structure of the ACB is under the auspices of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) division, which is tasked and functionally handles and detects crimes of the conventional type; maintain public order, fraud, illegal gambling, brokers, etc. And extraordinary crimes; narcotics, human, weapons trade etc. (Quah, 2015: 142-143). This means that, ACB's focus is not only on prevention and eradication of corruption, but CID duties are also the responsibility of ACB officers. The issue of overlap between ACB and CID is what causes inefficiencies in strategies and steps to eradicate corruption. Third, as mentioned above, the most corrupt institution in Singapore is in the SFC. The form of inefficiency lies in the prevalence of corruption within the police force. At that time, the corrupt actions of the police had become public secrets and seemed to be permissive to the colonial government. Although the data and facts of corruption are clearly discovered by commissions and task forces that have been formed, there is no firm action and political support for sanctions imposed on corruptors (Quah, 2015: 142-143).

Nevertheless, it was finally discovered that several stakeholders such as the ACB Commissioner and senator Elizabeth Choi gave political demands and pressure to the colonial government to amend the POCO, increase the quantity of ACB human resources, and give ACB autonomy rights along with institutional structure with SPF so that independence. The implications of political support for the effectiveness of corruption eradication strategies can be observed in the table below.

Table 3. Matrix of Anti Corruption Strategy

		Anti-corruption Measures	
		Adequate	Inadequate
Commitment of Political Leadership	Strong	Effective Strategy	Ineffective Strategy II
	Weak	Ineffective Strategy I	“Hopeless” Strategy

Source: Jon S.T. Quah, “Bureaucratic Corruption in the ASEAN Countries: A Comparative Analysis of Their Anti-Corruption Strategies,” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 13 (1, March 1982): 175, Table 4.

Based on the matrix in table 3 in the first slot, it illustrates that if political support from leaders or governments against corruption eradication is strong and is supported by integrated, planned and holistic strategies and steps of anti-corruption agencies, an effective and efficient corruption eradication process can be realized. Based on the Quah comparative study in six Asian countries, this trend indicates that political support along with the integrity of anti-corruption institutions through a capable strategy is realized in countries such as Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong (Quah, 1982: 175).

Furthermore, according to Quah, eradicating corruption in a country can be done if the government implements various strategies and preventive measures through state institutions, in this case the corruption eradication agency. However, even though the strategy formulated and implemented is so good, integrated and holistic if it is not accompanied by strong political support by multi-stakeholders, it will hamper the effectiveness and efficiency of the agency and eradicate corruption itself. Also, from the strong political support will give the significance of authority and authority in eradicating corruption through the legislative

process (Quah, 1982: 174-175). Therefore, one of the most potential preconditions in eradicating corruption in government entities is political commitment from various stakeholders and must be accompanied by an integrated and holistic corruption eradication strategy from anti-corruption agencies.

In addition to low political commitment, during colonial periodization, the factual conditions that occur in the police institution that encourage corrupt behavior lie in the aspects of honorarium and incentives. For example, a low level of income for police with brigadier positions only ranges from \$ 4 to \$ 15 per month (Quah, 1979: 29). This is also explained by Palmier, that one of the main factors causing corruption is the low employee incentives that allow them to abuse their authority and authority for personal gain (Palmier, 1985: 2.6). Furthermore, Paulo Mauro emphasized that when the honorarium and incentives of the State Civil Service (ASN) are low, they will use their authority to carry out a bribery process in order to increase their personal financial coffers (Mauro, 1975: 5). Then, working conditions that are not conducive such as the absence of work uniform and operational accommodation make it more difficult for these officers to

finance their daily lives. Therefore, the above objective conditions encourage and allow police to commit corrupt acts such as accepting bribes from illegal gambling and seeking additional income outside of police duties that are legally prohibited in Singapore. For more details, the following data on the amount of SPF honorarium during colonial regime.

**Table 4. Monthly Income since 1887
Colonial Police Force Period**

RANK IN SPF	MONTHLY SALARY
European Contingent	
Inspector 1 st Class	S\$100 (no rations)
Inspector 2 nd Class	S\$80 (S\$5 rations)
Inspector 3 rd Class	S\$60 (S\$10 rations)
Sergeant	S\$50 (S\$10 rations)
Constable	S\$40 (S\$10 rations)
Native Contingent	
Sergeant	S\$15
Corporal	S\$12
Constable 1 st Class	S\$10
Constable 2 nd Class	S\$9
Constable 3 rd Class	S\$8
Peon 1 st Class	S\$5
Peon 2 nd Class	S\$4

Source: Quah on *Straits Times*, 4 October 1987.

Furthermore, even though massive cases of corruption occur in the police institution, it does not necessarily nullify acts of corruption in the sector of the public and private institutions. So, in this era corruption has become “the way of life” in the community entities and public officials. Institutions such as the Customs Office, Immigration, Taxes, etc. are also not spared from racial practices. The granting of permits, concessions and even tax evasion and bribery systems by officials and the public is proven to be carried out in all sectors.

B. SINGAPORE’S CORRUPTION ERADICATION STRATEGY

The corruption that occurred so massively during the colonial periodization did not dampen the intention of the People’s Action Party (PAP) in eradicating corruption. Since occupying the government in 1959, they have realized that in ensuring sustainable

development in Singapore, there needs to be a constructive transformation process from the strategy to eradicate corruption that has been applied by the colonial government (Quah, 2001: 32). By referring to these facts, the task encountered by the PAP leadership was to minimize the opportunities for officials to commit corruption and change the perceptions and perspectives of the community towards corruption from the “way of life” to “fact of life”. The concrete and comprehensive step taken by the PAP leaders in 1960 was to enact regulations that were outlined in the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) which would later strengthen the “power” of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) anti-corruption institution (Quah, 20014: 2). In addition, designing measures that are considered capable of controlling corruption behavior and closing opportunities for corruption in the public and private sectors by increasing remuneration and incentive for officials.

B.1 Reducing Corruption Opportunities

After World War II, like countries in Europe, Asia also experienced economic instability including Singapore. In 1960, Singapore had a low gross national product (GNP) level of around 1,330 Singapore dollars or if it was converted into the American exchange rate of 443 dollars (Encyclopedia Singapore, 1986: 9). This condition prevents the government from increasing the remuneration of the State Civil Apparatus so that the initial step focuses on strengthening regulations and legislation to reduce the chances of corruption occurring while increasing legal sanctions for racial offenders which can have implications for the perception and deterrent effects of corruption.

In its development, there are five important aspects that are regulated in POCA so that it significantly reduces POCO inefficiencies and provides institutional strengthening and tasks and functions of the CPIB. First, the

regulations contained in POCA have a wider scope than POCO. It was noted, there were 32 then increasing to 37 articles formulated in POCA while in POCO itself during the colonial periodization only 12 articles. Second, the definition of corruption is increasingly progressive under the leadership and commissioners of the CPIB. The terminology of corruption is increasingly being expanded which accommodates "gratification" as part of acts of corruption. This is stated in article 2 of POCA. Third, improve corruption prevention through the addition of legal sanctions and fines for corruptors for 5 years in prison and a fine of 10,000 Singapore dollars (article 5 POCA), then in its most recent development rose by 100,000 Singapore dollars in 1989. Fourth, public, private, and people who are legally proven to accept bribes and gratuities are obliged to return them later plus appropriate punishment as a court decision (Article 13 POCA). Fifth, give authority and "power" to CPIB in eradicating corruption. For example, in article 15 POCA grants the authority of the CPIB to arrest and hunt down fugitive suspects. In addition, in article 17, CPIB leaders and commissioners are given the authority to investigate accounts and bank accounts of parties suspected of having potential corruption. Article 18 also gives the authority to periodically inspect the personal accounts of ASN and their families. This means that, the fifth aspect of POCA's reforms is strengthening CPIB in eradicating corruption (Quah, 2001: 33).

In ensuring the efficiency and effectiveness of the CPIB, the PAP also takes an innovative step from year to year beyond the scope of POCA by amending legislation that is deemed important to be revised. In 1963, the PAP amended the function of witnesses in the court. This step is intended so that witnesses can cooperatively provide information to investigators (Quah, 2001: 33).

There are two main amendments that were very useful in 1966 regarding measures

to eradicate corruption. First, the amendment to Article 28 which states that a person can be found guilty of a criminal act of corruption even though he does not really accept the bribe, if he has the intention and awareness to enter the system or mechanism of corruption. Second, citizens who work as government agents outside the country will still be tried as a legal system that applies in Singapore if they are legally proven to be corrupt (Quah, 1978: 13).

Furthermore, in 1981, the PAP incrementally amended the POCA article to affirm sanctions and increase the deterrent effect on perpetrators of corruption by the mechanism of returning compensation for all proven corrupt money and snares and legal sanctions decided in court. If restitution cannot be fulfilled, legal sanctions will be doubled. Also, the imposition of confiscation of benefits imposed by the CPIB investigative commission on March 3, 1989. This mechanism of restitution and legal sanctions proved effective in providing a deterrent effect on corruptors.

Facts found in Singapore on the suicide case of Singapore's National Development Minister Cheang Wan Tea. Minister Teh reportedly committed suicide 12 days after the CPIB commissioner interrogated him which led to two accusations by the witness of a contridor. The Minister of Tea was charged with two bribery cases in 1981 and 1982. Where he each received bribes from the Developer for 1 million Singapore dollars to give land concessions. (Singapore, 1987: 1-37).

CPIB plays an important role in enforcing the regulations stipulated in the POCA articles. In terms of institutional posture, the agency's personnel have several additional personnel. Until 1960, there were 71 personnel consisting of 49 investigators and 22 support staff. Even so, CPIB does not require a large quantity of personnel and institutional size such as anti-racial institutions based in Hong Kong, ICAC. Because the CPIB itself, in addition

to its authority, is also within the scope and location of the prime minister’s office which enables the CPIB to coordinate and collaborate with stakeholders from both the private sector and the public sector. Thus, it can help the CPIB handle cases of corruption responsively that occurred in the public and private sectors at that time.

In general, there are three tasks and functions of the CPIB. First, receive reports and investigate corruption cases in the private and public sectors. Second, examine administrative errors either intentionally or not that allow corrupt actions to occur. Third, examine public service practices and procedures to minimize opportunities that lead to corrupt actions.

B.2 Civil Servant Remunerations

The preconditions that have been established by the PAP by designing the institutional independence of the CPIB as well as implementing incremental amendments do not reduce the focus of the government to improve and improve in eradicating corruption. In March 1972, steps to increase remuneration for SCS apparatus were immediately followed up. This step is assessed to improve the performance and integrity of employees and be able to have implications for the conduciveness of the work environment. (Quah, 1984: 296). This trend was fully supported by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in every state speech and national and international conference. He stated that one of the effective measures to eradicate corruption was to increase the incentives of politicians and state officials and the ASN to create an honest, clean and open government for multi-stakeholders. (Straits Times, 1985: 14-16).

Furthermore, the remuneration step proposed by the government is increasing employee salaries on par with the private sector and also reconstructing the working environment of the ASN. The conduciveness of the work environment in question includes

work systems adopted from the private sector that are performance-based or in the realm of public administration called New Public Management. Significant increases in remuneration occurred in the 1973, 1979, 1982, 1989, and 1994 periods whose salary levels were equivalent to the private sector. It was noted, the data released from a White Paper on Competitive Salaries for Competent and Honest Government in 1994 showed the equalization of salary amounts between ASN and the private sector in 6 professional sectors such as Accountants, Banking, Engineering, Lawyers, Manufacturing, and Multinational Companies. Just look at the table below which illustrates the significant amount of incentives after the colonial administration ended.

Table 5. The Amount of Singaporean Civil Servant

GRADE	MONTHLY SALARY (US\$)*
Permanent Secretary	
Staff Grade V	S\$51,155 (US\$30,091)
Staff Grade IV	S\$43,865 (US\$25,802)
Staff Grade III	S\$36,570 (US\$21,511)
Staff Grade II	S\$31,710 (US\$18,652)
Staff Grade I	S\$26,845 (US\$15,791)
Superscale A	S\$22,935 (US\$13,491)
Superscale B	S\$19,340 (US\$11,376)
Superscale C	S\$16,065 (US\$9,450)
Deputy Secretary	
Superscale DI	S\$13,635 (US\$8,020)
Superscale D	S\$12,365 (US\$7,273)
Superscale E1	S\$11,465 (US\$6,744)
Superscale E	S\$10,570 (US\$6,217)
Superscale F	S\$9,720 (US\$5,717)
Superscale G	S\$8,875 (US\$5,220)

Source: Quah, 2001 in Public Service Commission

C. Lesson Learn for Indonesia

There are various lessons that can be learned by various countries in the world, especially Indonesia, which can be transformed into eradication strategies by anti-corruption institutions. Although there are two aspects that might not be possible to be adopted related to the strategy to eradicate corruption in Singapore. First, all countries have their own distinctions and differences from the context of historical, economic, political, demographic,

and even geographical backgrounds. Secondly, when referring to Singapore's experience in eradicating corruption where the country is spending a lot of money in accommodating the honorarium of politicians and the State Civil Apparatus, certainly not all countries have stable capacity and economic growth, especially in some developing countries. Nevertheless, at least some of the steps and strategies formulated by Quah below, can be used as references and become the best standards or best practices in implementing strategies to eradicate corruption in other countries, especially Indonesia.

First, strong political commitment (Strong Leadership). Singapore was able to eradicate corruption after the end of the colonial government because of the full support of the elite and PAP political party leaders. This form of political support is to try racial agents indiscriminately and selectively. Whatever position and background of corruptors, both high and low officials must be tried with the applicable legal provisions. In Indonesia itself after the New Order regime, relatively high political commitment was given to the Habibie government through Law No. 31 of 1999 concerning the administration of a country free from corruption, collusion and nepotism. Also, President Abdurrahman Wahid legitimized the establishment of the Joint Corruption Eradication Team (RGPTK) which would later become the embryo of the establishment of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and received support and struggle for anti-corruption activists such as Indonesian Corruption Watch, anti-corruption NGOs, and institutions affiliates. So that it was known further, that the KPK was formed and legitimized in the Megawati Soekarno Putri government. Even so, after the KPK was formed, several parliamentary elites, the police, and even the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Government themselves did not consistently show their political commitment in combating corruption in Indonesia. This can be proven through

cases of officials from government circles, parliament, and the family of the President who were involved in corruption at that time. In fact, in the most recent cases such as the dissolution and “conciliation” movement of the KPK through the questionnaire “inquiry rights” initiated by parliament, it was increasingly emphasized that political commitment by elites and leaders to eradicate corruption had not shown seriousness and firmness.

Second, a comprehensive and effective corruption eradication strategy. Corruption is a case with a very complex scope, by which a comprehensive, integrated and holistic strategy is needed. Strategic steps in the form of controlling the effectiveness of regulations and legislation related to corruption. If regulations and laws are deemed not to resolve corruption cases, amendments and changes are a necessity and must be carried out. Referring to Singapore's experience, the articles contained in the POCA incrementally underwent changes following the obstacles to eradicating corruption cases that occurred. Whereas in Indonesia, the senators in the parliament have an interest in dissolving the KPK through the movement carried out by the leadership of the honorable state institution. Not to mention, the formation of a special committee for the KPK Questionnaire will only interfere with the focus on eradicating increasingly complex corruption, especially in cases of alleged corruption in the Electronic Population Identity Card (E-KTP) project which has been public attention to date. In the context of the strategy to eradicate corruption, according to the author's view, the KPK has integrated, planned and holistic steps and strategies so far. One of the breakthroughs was that the KPK launched a pocket book on the criteria of corruption that could become the grip of the community and all stakeholders so that knowledge about corruption could be widespread in the archipelago.

Third, the credibility of anti-corruption institutions. Becoming a credible and trusted institution requires values and attitudes in the form of integrity, honesty, professionalism, and independence in the person of the anti-racial institution itself. All institutions and employees both vertically and horizontally affiliated with anti-corruption bodies must be free from corruption trends. By him, a recruitment system is needed based on the merit system and also the independence of state officials especially the Prime Minister and the President. In the case of the effectiveness of corruption eradication that occurred in Singapore, since the government was taken over by the PAP under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew, this Prime Minister through his authority appointed individuals who would occupy strategic positions at CPIB. It becomes interesting, because even though the Prime Minister has the authority to appoint CPIB officials directly, but does not impulsively have the authority to regulate the direction of this anti-racial institution policy. This means that the independence and credibility of the CPIB can still be accounted for. In Indonesia, the credibility and integrity of KPK officials and employees is very good. Even so, it was noted that there were a number of track records of national phenomena which showed the existence of leaders and several KPK commissioners who had been involved in criminal acts because they were criminalized by party elites, elite police institutions, even the government in the administration period of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

III. Conclusion

Based on the explanation above, it can be concluded that combating corruption is a process that continues to dwell and continue. The state to be corruption-free and clean must be supported by strong political commitment from all stakeholders especially the head of government and party elite and accompanied by teaching and practicing the attitudes and

behavior of public and community officials so that the corruption paradigm as a "way of life" can be shifted to "Fact of life" that must be resolved in order to lead life and mutual prosperity. Singapore's change is what it is today thanks to the political commitment of PAP leaders and heads of government under Lee Kuan Yew who are able to legitimize CPIB against independence, integrity and credibility in combating corruption indiscriminately and shifting the cultural paradigm and ethics of corruption to public officials and Singaporeans. For Indonesia, if elites and public officials can commit and firmly eradicate corruption through full support of the KPK, it is not impossible that Indonesia will be free from corruption. The last but not the least, quoting Mahatma Gandhi, "the Earth is sufficient to serve human needs, but not enough to fulfill human greed."

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